Threat Pulse W24 — Massive Scan Surge & Critical RCE Campaign Blitz
Executive Summary
The week of 2026-05-29 to 2026-06-08 recorded 391,261 inbound probes against tarpit-lab.xyz — a 150.8% increase over the prior week. The surge is attributable to two concurrent threat patterns: a high-volume Telnet scanning operation originating predominantly from a single DigitalOcean-hosted source, and a tightly synchronized burst of critical-severity RCE campaigns targeting known CVEs across HTTP-exposed services. Brute-force credential stuffing against Telnet and database facades also remained active, with default credentials dominating the password spray lists.
Attack Volume & Trends
| Metric | Value | Change |
|---|---|---|
| Total Probes | 391,261 | +150.8% WoW |
| Scan | 314,079 | Dominant category |
| Bruteforce | 50,421 | Active |
| Recon | 17,050 | Moderate |
| RCE | 8,007 | Elevated |
| Exploit | 1,704 | Elevated |
| Auth | 3 | Negligible |
Facade breakdown:
| Facade | Hits | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| fake-telnet | 289,802 | 74% of all traffic |
| fake-ssh | 56,035 | Consistent bruteforce target |
| fake-postgres | 20,538 | Default credential probing |
| fake-http | 9,462 | RCE campaign target |
| fake-https | 9,295 | RCE campaign target |
| fake-redis | 2,429 | Unauthenticated access attempts |
| fake-mysql | 2,176 | Credential stuffing |
| fake-mongodb | 1,524 | Credential stuffing |
The fake-telnet facade absorbed nearly three-quarters of all traffic, an extraordinary concentration driven by what appears to be a systematic, large-scale port scanner operating out of DigitalOcean infrastructure. Fake-SSH maintained its expected bruteforce baseline. The HTTP/HTTPS facades, while lower in absolute volume, carried the highest-severity attack payloads.
Top Threat Actors
| Rank | Source Region | Hosting | Events | Primary Behavior |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | GB | DigitalOcean, LLC | 123,150 | Scan |
| 2 | NL | DigitalOcean, LLC | 17,656 | Scan |
| 3 | RO | SS-Net | 17,616 | Scan |
| 4 | US | DigitalOcean, LLC | 15,287 | Scan |
| 5 | US | GoDaddy.com, LLC | 15,137 | Scan |
- The top source alone accounts for 123,150 events (31.5% of all weekly traffic), an extreme concentration indicating either a dedicated scanning tool or a compromised/rented VPS running automated mass-scan operations.
- DigitalOcean appears in three of the top five positions across three geographic regions (GB, NL, US), consistent with the well-documented pattern of threat actors renting low-cost cloud VPS instances for scanning infrastructure.
- The Romanian SS-Net source stands out as a non-major-cloud actor generating near-equivalent volume to top cloud sources, suggesting a dedicated or compromised host.
- GoDaddy-hosted infrastructure in position 5 may indicate a compromised customer hosting account rather than a purpose-built attack platform.
Active Campaigns
A striking feature this week is that four distinct critical-severity RCE campaigns each registered almost exactly 77,186 hits, and the HTTP/2 PRI probe registered 77,189 — a near-perfect volume alignment strongly suggesting coordinated or scripted campaign delivery from a shared toolset or botnet.
HTTP/2 PRI Method Probe [LOW]
- 77,189 hits | Type: Scan
- Probes for HTTP/2 upgrade support by sending the
PRI * HTTP/2.0preface to HTTP/HTTPS listeners. - Primarily a service fingerprinting and enumeration step preceding higher-severity exploitation.
Hikvision ISAPI RCE [CRITICAL]
- 77,186 hits | Type: RCE
- Targets the well-documented Hikvision IP camera ISAPI authentication bypass and remote code execution vulnerability.
- Exploitation of this CVE enables unauthenticated command execution on exposed camera management interfaces, commonly used to recruit devices into IoT botnets.
PHPUnit eval-stdin RCE [CRITICAL]
- 77,186 hits | Type: RCE
- Exploits the legacy PHPUnit
eval-stdin.phpremote code execution flaw (CVE-2017-9841), which remains widely targeted due to the continued presence of exposedvendor/directories in production web applications.
Apache Path Traversal / RCE [CRITICAL]
- 77,186 hits | Type: Path Traversal / RCE
- Targets Apache HTTP Server path traversal vulnerabilities, including the CVE-2021-41773/42013 family. Successful exploitation allows directory traversal and, where
mod_cgiis enabled, remote code execution.
GeoServer OGC Filter RCE [CRITICAL]
- 77,186 hits | Type: RCE
- Exploits CVE-2024-36401, an unauthenticated RCE vulnerability in GeoServer's OGC filter evaluation. This is a recently disclosed and actively weaponized CVE that has seen sustained exploitation globally.
> Analyst note: The synchronized hit counts across four distinct critical campaigns strongly suggest these are being delivered by a single automated framework or botnet performing multi-payload sweeps against every discovered HTTP/HTTPS listener.
Notable Paths & Techniques
Unstable/Malformed Protocol Traffic
UNSTABLEmarker — 26,921 hits: A significant volume of connections produced protocol-level anomalies or incomplete handshakes. This is consistent with high-speed mass scanners that initiate connections without completing protocol negotiation, or with evasion techniques testing for non-standard service responses.
PostgreSQL Targeting
database=postgres— 9,752 hits: Direct targeting of the default PostgreSQL database name, consistent with automated tools attempting to enumerate or authenticate against exposed Postgres instances.
Default Credential Brute-Force (Telnet/IoT)
A dense cluster of default and weak credentials was observed in credential spray activity:
| Password | Hits | Notes |
|---|---|---|
admin |
4,002 | Universal default |
xc3511 |
2,582 | Hikvision DVR default |
vizxv |
2,379 | Dahua/generic DVR default |
| (empty) | 2,141 | No-auth probe |
password |
1,749 | Generic default |
123456 |
1,634 | Common weak password |
888888 |
1,549 | Dahua DVR default |
12345 |
1,417 | Common weak password |
- The presence of
xc3511(Hikvision) andvizxv/888888(Dahua) passwords directly correlates with the Hikvision ISAPI RCE campaign, confirming that attackers are combining credential spraying with CVE exploitation in a layered IoT device compromise strategy. - This password list is consistent with Mirai botnet variants and derivatives, which have historically used these exact credentials to propagate across exposed IoT devices.
Geographic Distribution
| Country | Probe Volume | Notable |
|---|---|---|
| 🇬🇧 GB | 124,735 | Dominated by single DigitalOcean source |
| 🇺🇸 US | 96,419 | Mixed cloud and hosting providers |
| 🇳🇱 NL | 36,471 | DigitalOcean infrastructure |
| 🇷🇴 RO | 32,453 | SS-Net hosted source |
| 🇸🇬 SG | 29,445 | Elevated; likely cloud-hosted scanners |
| 🇨🇳 CN | 14,926 | Distributed, mixed sources |
| 🇮🇩 ID | 10,176 | Likely compromised consumer/IoT devices |
| 🇵🇱 PL | 6,832 | Moderate activity |
- GB and US together represent 56% of observed probe traffic, though the GB concentration is almost entirely attributable to a single cloud-hosted IP, not broad national origin.
- Singapore's elevated volume is consistent with its role as a regional cloud hub in Southeast Asia, frequently used for attack staging.
- Indonesia's presence at this volume is characteristic of compromised endpoint devices (routers, DVRs, IoT) rather than deliberate cloud-based attack infrastructure.
Recommendations
- Patch or isolate Hikvision and Dahua devices immediately. The convergence of CVE-targeting RCE campaigns and matching default credentials confirms active, automated exploitation attempts. Any internet-exposed CCTV/DVR management interfaces should be placed behind VPN or firewall controls.
- Remove or restrict access to PHPUnit vendor directories in production. CVE-2017-9841 exploitation continues at scale. Audit web application deployments to ensure
vendor/phpunitor similar paths are not publicly accessible.
- Apply Apache HTTP Server patches for CVE-2021-41773/42013. These vulnerabilities remain heavily scanned; ensure running Apache versions are current and
mod_cgiis disabled where not required.
- Assess GeoServer exposure. CVE-2024-36401 is recently disclosed and seeing sustained exploitation. GeoServer instances should be updated to a patched release and access restricted to authorized networks.
- Enforce non-default credentials on all Telnet/IoT/database services. The observed password spray list maps precisely to factory defaults. There is no operational justification for retaining these credentials on internet-facing systems.
- Monitor for DigitalOcean-originated scanning traffic. Three of the top five sources this week used DigitalOcean infrastructure. Consider implementing temporary rate-limiting or tarpit rules for high-frequency connections from this ASN when not operationally required.
- Disable Telnet entirely where not required. With 74% of probe volume targeting Telnet, the attack surface reduction from disabling this service is substantial. SSH with key-based authentication should replace Telnet in all cases.
- Restrict PostgreSQL, MySQL, MongoDB, and Redis to localhost or VPN. Default-database probing activity confirms these services are being scanned at scale for unauthenticated or default-credential access.